I would echo what Paul says – Richard North has loads of fascinating
articles about the MoD and the European dimension on his websites. I link to a
couple of pages in the following:

The basics of mine resistant vehicles have been known since the 50s or so.
We even had some early MRAP-ish type vehicles in Bosnia for the bomb disposal
crews. The lessons learnt years ago on how to mitigate the threat of
explosives under vehicles were forgotten or ignored.

Mine resistant vehicles have been in use in African states for decades and
there are no decent excuses for British forces not being equipped with them
far sooner. Once it was clear our vehicles were inadequate things should have
moved quicker. The MoD was resistant to this until it had made sure the
funding for the current crop of MRAPs wouldn’t come from future MoD budgets.
Got to get your priorities right! There is also an element of using kit
correctly. If you’ve got vehicles that are great for keeping off the beaten
track (Vikings) but aren’t so hot at standing up to IEDs then don’t be using
them for regular patrol routes that the Taleban can mine.

With helicopters we had the opportunity to make Blackhawks under licence
but it didn’t happen. We made Apaches under licence at an extortionate cost
and now don’t operate enough of them.(It is said that we could have paid each
Westland worker

Perhaps they are just better fighters than us? Their tactics, leadership
and commitment are better. Our bureaucracy is still better than theirs. There
may be equipment issues, but surely we are still far better equipped then
them?
Just a thought.

It’s all very well saying buy foreign if it’s cheaper off the shelf but
consideration needs to be take about who owns the intellectual property rights
for systems that may be operated for 30 or more years. Mid-life upgrades,
add-ons etc, spare parts even can be very expensive otherwise. For example, an
American company that supplies the US armed forces as well as ours with the
widget Mkiv will be unwilling to cut its catalogue price to us or permit a
third party to make copies of the widget because it is expected to make its
profits from foreign sales.
What is needed is a realistic defence review
and a realisation that we cannot combine national defence with acting as the
world’s policeman/socialworker to big up the foreign office. Even a province
in Afghanistan cannot be fought with a reinforced brigade which is all we can
field at present. Therefore, smaller scale, smarter interventions should be
planned and catered for in order to concentrate scarce resources on protecting
vital national interests. Take a look at the Defence of the Realm and
ThinkDefence blogs to see how the” underfunded” MoD wastes a significant
percentage of its budget. It’s partly because in trying to be a Jack of All
Trades it spreads its money too thinly and loses much through evaporation. And
then because it hasn’t got the right tools for the job it hope to rely on
experience to muddle through with what it has. Often the wrong lessons are
learnt or the experience is inappropriate. Hence in Iraq and Afghanistan our
brass lectured the Americans on Malaya and Northern Ireland whilst forgetting
the lessons of Cyprus, Aden, Oman, Bosnia (lEDs countered by mine protected
vehicles etc). This meant that soft hats and Snatch Land Rovers were issued to
fatal results. The troops lacked suitable patrol vehicles because, despite
thirty years of failed projects and collaboration, nobody could decide how tho
replace the CVR(T) family with a patrol/scout vehicle that ticked all the
boxes. For want of a nail etc…

It’s a disgrace: virtually no progress has been made since the first Gulf
war, when field experience showed just how unsuited the standard issue
weaponry was in desert conditions. All those MoD desk-bound fellows – more
than the number of front-line forces – have not responded, so, as you say,
many deaths have resulted needlessly.